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Abstract 
Buying Support without Brokers: Conditional Cash Transfers in 
Turkey and Argentina 
Mine Tafolar, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
Supervisor: Kurt Weyland 
Abstract: This master‟s report examines how the implementation of conditional 
cash transfer (CCT) programs, which allocate benefits according to objective poverty 
criteria, affect entrenched patterns of clientelism, that is, the long-established provision of 
social benefits for political-electoral purposes. By analyzing two “most different” cases, 
Turkey and Argentina, the thesis probes the explanatory power of three major approaches 
in political science. Culturalism predicts that the traditional values underlying clientelism 
will corrode CCT implementation and lead to the distribution of the new benefits as 
political favors. Constructivism, by contrast, expects the modern, advanced principles 
embodied in CCTs sooner or later to create pressures for the transformation of traditional 
social programs and the abandonment of clientelism. But my extensive field research 
shows that neither of these approaches is convincing. Instead, non-clientelistic CCTs and 
traditional clientelistic programs exist side by side. This finding provides support for a 
rational-choice institutionalist approach that highlights the political-electoral incentives 
for politicians to target some constituencies with traditional clientelistic programs while 
viii 
appealing to others with modern, non-clientelistic CCTs. Moreover, poorer voters have 
incentives to obtain benefits in whatever way they are offered, entering into traditional 
exchange relationships to obtain clientelistic benefits while simultaneously complying 
with the objective criteria and conditions for receiving CCTs. 
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Introduction 
The politics of distribution, especially in the developing world, is replete with 
stories of clientelistic exchanges between politicians and specific constituents in which 
constituents‟ receipt of a benefit is contingent upon their political support (Fox 1994; 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Magaloni, Díaz-Cayeros and Estévez 2007; Scott 1972; 
Stokes 2007). The essential features of clientelism contrast starkly with the basic tenets of 
a rights-enhancing policy orientation. The unequal, particularistic, and vertical 
relationship between political officials and constituents central to clientelism is 
antithetical to the concept of democratic citizenship, since constituents forfeit their 
political autonomy in order to gain access to distributive programs.1 
In recent decades, however, many developing countries have begun to implement 
unique and innovative social welfare programs known as conditional cash transfers 
(hereafter CCTs) against the backdrop of traditional clientelist politics. These programs 
aim to reduce poverty by transferring money to low-income individuals on the condition 
that they send their children to school and take them for regular check-ups at health 
centers. In theory, CCTs are centralized, bureaucratically administered, and based on 
1 Following Guillermo O‟Donnell, I define citizens as “carriers of rights and obligations that derive from 
their membership in a polity, and [who] hold personal and legal autonomy and, consequently, 
responsibility for their own actions” (O‟Donnell 1999, 305). The status of full citizenship, therefore, 
entails the attainment of universal political rights, a guarantee of civil rights and social entitlements, 
including the right to have access to the educational system and social services through the rule of law, 
and a rigorous network of accountability (Marshall 1950; O‟Donnell 1999). Clientelism is therefore 
viewed as contradictory to the basic notion of citizenship, which is premised on universal rights and 
entitlements rather than personal and arbitrary favors. 
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objective eligibility criteria. Such cash transfer programs currently operate in at least 45 
countries throughout the developing world, including several in Latin America and the 
Middle East, and provide cash to roughly 110 million families (Hanlon, Barrientos, and 
Hulme 2010). 
Incumbent political parties‟ widespread CCT implementation, especially in 
countries like Turkey and Argentina that have pervasive clientelism, can result in one of 
three outcomes. First, the adoption of the programs can perpetuate firmly-established 
clientelistic practices, if traditionally clientelist parties manage to use the new benefits in 
exchange for political support. Second, CCTs can achieve distribution of benefits based 
on citizenship rights, coexisting side-by-side with extant clientelistic practices. Third, 
CCTs can improve overall social assistance distribution through spillover effects to other 
programs which lead to the purging of clientelist intermediation. This paper examines 
which outcome best describes the changes instilled in society by CCTs. Do clientelistic 
politicians corrupt CCTs‟ positive characteristics? Or do the programs bring about real 
change, either by introducing certain non-clientelistic practices or by transforming the 
entire nature of social assistance for the poor? 
The current paper proceeds as follows: I first discuss the design features of CCTs 
and lay out the expectations of three basic paradigms in political science: culturalism, 
rational choice institutionalism (RCI), and constructivism, which give rise to the three 
hypotheses just mentioned. Then I explain the case selection of Turkey and Argentina. In 
the following section, I present the empirical findings from the case studies. I argue that 
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clientelistic and non-clientelistic programs in Turkey and Argentina coexist as a result of 
the strategic calculations of incumbent political leaders. These findings support a rational 
choice explanation and challenge the assumptions of culturalism and constructivism. The 
final section discusses the substantive significance and implications of the results. 
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Theory and Hypotheses 
As conceived by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) that promote them, 
CCT programs differ from the traditional clientelistic allocation of social services. CCTs 
possess several features that differentiate them from broker-mediated, clientelistic 
exchanges, which are contingent upon recipients‟ electoral support. By design, CCTs are 
regularized and guided by objective criteria rather than being ad-hoc, non-regular, and 
discretionary like clientelistic forms of social assistance. Second, there is a conditionality 
attached to the programs such that the continuation of benefits hinges on recipients‟ 
compliance with pre-specified criteria, especially regular school attendance and health 
clinic check-ups for children, including receipt of all childhood vaccinations. 
Accordingly, a CCT recipient loses her benefit when she does not fulfill these conditions. 
Presumably, the receipt of the benefit depends not on the beneficiary‟s vote choice but on 
the fulfillment of the income eligibility and conditionality criteria. Third, CCTs allocate 
direct, non-mediated cash transfers to poor people. Recipient mothers can go directly to 
local bank branches or post offices to withdraw their payments by showing their IDs or 
bankcards. This feature of the CCT is meant to prevent the intervention of a political 
party broker in the disbursement of the benefit. Finally, there is a toll-free phone service 
in which citizens can ask questions about the program, the application process, and 
payments and receive information. As with the direct distribution of CCTs, this 
bureaucratic problem-solving mechanism associated with the CCT should hinder the 
interference of political party brokers because bureaucratically administered social policy 
offices, rather than political party branches, are in charge of solving recipients‟ problems 
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concerning their CCT payments. The formal design features of the CCTs diminish the 
likelihood of mediation and thus the possibility that benefits will be offered by party 
brokers as part of a clientelistic bargain. 
Will the formal institutional features of CCTs supersede the entrenched 
clientelistic practices and regulate distribution in a non-clientelistic fashion? Or will these 
programs lead to even more transformative and permanent changes within these 
societies? For example, once normatively superior CCTs are established, will the rights- 
based design features of these programs spill over to existing clientelistic practices and 
alter the logic of social assistance distribution? Three important schools of thought in 
political science address these questions from different perspectives, from which the 
current paper‟s three rival hypotheses are derived. 
Hypothesis 1: Entrenched clientelistic practices will prevail over the formal design of the 
CCTs. Accordingly, CCTs will end up being administered in a clientelistic way. 
First, a culturalist perspective emphasizes the strength of entrenched beliefs, 
customs, and expectations that are internalized and extensively shared among individuals 
in a society (Ross 2009, 158). According to culturalism, it is hard to change these deep- 
rooted habits and practices simply by changing formal institutions. Therefore, a cultural 
paradigm questions the role institutions play in shaping outcomes. Formal institutional 
rules that do not consider the enduring practices and value systems in societies are seen 
as unsustainable (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Carballo 1997; Lichbach 2003). 
Culturalism, thus, concludes that it is necessary to turn to shared cultural meanings to 
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understand the true political processes and dynamics in a society (Lagos 1997). In other 
words, entrenched cultural habits will corrode new formal institutions. 
A cultural framework hypothesizes that the introduction of formal institutional 
reforms such as CCTs is insufficient to transform the dominant, underlying social 
practices and to bring about genuine change in political outcomes. From this perspective, 
politicians and local brokers in traditionally clientelistic societies will find ways to 
manipulate the design of the conditional cash transfer programs in order to safeguard 
their entrenched powers and advantages, offering CCTs in exchange for votes. In this 
scenario, preexisting clientelistic practices will dominate over formal institutional 
changes. In other words, even if centrally designed public assistance programs with clear 
criteria are introduced, the established political elites and local patrons will subvert non- 
clientelist design efforts and will not change their grounded practices. Party brokers who 
offer material inducements to voters in exchange for their support will offer the 
conditional cash transfers as part of a similar clientelistic bargain. Voters, who are used to 
receiving clientelist inducements, will view the CCTs as contingent on reciprocity. 
Clientelistic traditions and attitudes, rather than the formal rules, will shape the behavior 
of the actors in these societies. Deeply rooted clientelistic patterns will prevail over 
formal institutional changes, thereby hindering an abrupt policy reform in CCT 
allocation. 
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Hypothesis 2: Conditional cash transfers will be distributed in a programmatic 
way in line with the formal institutional design of the program. However, politicians will 
continue to distribute traditional programs in a clientelistic manner. 
In contrast to a cultural perspective, which attributes a causal role to deeply rooted 
habits and practices, rational choice institutionalism (RCI) highlights the importance of 
institutions as they create incentives and constraints for self-interested behavior. 
Institutions establish the context in which political actors determine their strategies and 
follow their interests (Ames 2001). Therefore, while culturalists are pessimistic about the 
effects of formal institutions, rational choice institutionalists are moderately optimistic 
about their impact. They postulate that the design of institutions provides information and 
incentives for societal actors. Thus, utility-maximizing individuals respond pragmatically 
to the specific incentives and constraints of each program, easily adjusting to their 
particular features. According to this calculus approach, since people aim to maximize 
their interests, rather than adhere to a coherent set of principles or values, they will 
flexibly adapt to different program designs. Preferences, however, are unaffected by 
institutions. Because preferences are exogenous, institutional reforms in one particular 
sphere will not generate profound changes in other spheres or transform actors‟ 
underlying normative orientations (Hall and Taylor 1996; Shepsle 1989; Weingast 2002). 
According to this framework, politicians and local brokers will act in accordance 
with the formal institutional design of the conditional cash transfer programs rather than 
seek to undermine them. The incentive structure of the cash transfer programs constrains 
8 
brokers and politicians, preventing them from meddling with the bureaucratic process. 
However, self-interested party brokers are able to use traditional programs in a 
clientelistic fashion and allocate resources to their clientele contingent on each 
beneficiary‟s support. Voters will realize their receipt of CCT benefits does not hinge on 
political support and will adjust their behavior based on the design of the CCT program. 
This will remain distinct from clientelistic exchanges. Institutional reforms in one sphere 
will not serve to reorient the underlying normative beliefs of actors toward a more rights- 
based perspective. Instead, programmatic CCTs and traditional clientelistic programs will 
coexist in these societies, and actors will follow the corresponding rules to gain access to 
each of these programs. 
Hypothesis 3: The introduction of rights-based cash transfers in one sphere of 
welfare provisioning will lead actors to redefine their interests and change their 
behaviors, encouraging reforms in traditional particularistic programs. 
As yet another school of thought, constructivists argue that ideational factors and 
changing political norms, rather than rational incentives, shape people‟s policy 
expectations and behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001; Hall 1989; Sikkink 1991). 
Since identities and interests are not objectively grounded in material forces, 
understanding interests is much more complex than envisioned by rationalist paradigms. 
Thus, widely shared normative self-understanding and epistemic interpretations of the 
material world, rather than instrumental rationality, shape policy choices and outcomes 
(Adler 1997; Ruggie 1998). Principled beliefs do not merely act as “theoretical fillers” 
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but can trigger actors to redefine their interests and change their behaviors (Blyth 1997). 
Intersubjective norms channel and regulate behavior by restricting the alternatives of 
choice and constraining actions. Therefore, idea and norm shifts are the major channels 
for system transformation (Finnemore 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 
1999). 
According to this model, rights-based values will establish themselves and 
eventually proliferate because of their normative superiority over particularistic and 
clientelistic policies. The constructivist paradigm suggests that the introduction of 
conditional cash transfers, which are universally oriented, programmatic, and normatively 
superior to clientelistic programs, will transform the underlying normative orientations of 
local brokers, politicians, and bureaucrats in charge of social policy provisioning as well 
as of beneficiaries receiving CCTs. This normative shift toward programmatic 
distribution will encourage bureaucrats to redesign other traditional programs to be 
compatible with the principles of a rights-enhancing policy framework. This changed 
normative consciousness might also propel CCT beneficiaries to demand similar 
programmatic and rights-based plans that cannot be conditioned on political support, 
triggering a spillover effect of rights-based plans delivered through the social assistance 
framework. The introduction of a principled social program will bring about the demise 
of inferior clientelistic programs. 
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Justification of Case Selection 
Two principles govern my case selection. First, I select two countries with 
rampant clientelistic practices, which are “least likely” cases for a CCT to be 
administered in a proper manner. Second, I select two “most different” cases, which 
diverge across all analytically relevant variables except the crucial similarity of their CCT 
creation. If CCTs have similar outcomes in these widely different settings, my findings 
can claim broader applicability. A comparative analysis of Turkey and Argentina best fits 
this case selection logic. 
First, the literature on both countries highlights their rampant clientelism, 
especially the strong clientelistic networks between the parties in power (Turkey‟s AKP 
and Argentina‟s FPV) and the poor (Auyero 1999; Auyero 2000; Bugra and Candas 
2011; Gunes-Ayata 1994; Kemahlioglu 2012; Levitsky 2003; Nichter 2008; Ozbudun 
1981; Stokes 2005; Yagci 2009). Scholarship on Argentine social programs demonstrates 
that most such programs tend to be distributed in a clientelistic and discretionary fashion 
(Calvo and Murillo 2004; Giraudy 2007; Lodola 2003; Nichter 2008; Stokes 2005; 
Weitz-Shapiro 2006). Studies of social assistance programs other than CCTs in Turkey 
attest to the predominance of clientelistic dynamics similar to those of Argentina 
(Aydogan 2009; Yoltar 2007). Furthermore, the AKP has forged strong clientelistic 
linkages with poor voters (Arikan-Akdag 2013; White 2012). Thus, given the 
predominance of clientelism in Turkey and Argentina and the heavy involvement of 
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incumbent political parties in clientelistic exchanges, these two countries are “least 
likely” cases for a CCT to be administered in a proper fashion. 
Second, Turkey and Argentina also are “most different systems”: They are 
maximally different across all analytically relevant variables except the independent 
variable of interest (i.e., CCT creation). For instance, the two countries are located in 
different world regions, have disparate cultures, and are governed by different 
institutional setups (i.e., federalism in Argentina and a unitary system in Turkey). In 
addition, the ideologies of the incumbent parties differ significantly; the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) in Turkey is a center-right conservative party with a neoliberal 
economic agenda, while the Front for Victory coalition in Argentina (FPV) is dominated 
by the left wing of the Peronist Justicialist Party (PJ).2 At the same time, there are two 
key similarities: their CCTs and widespread clientelistic exchanges that the incumbent 
parties have with the poor. This case-selection technique allows me to test whether CCT 
creation will result in similar outcomes in these two different settings (Bennett and Elman 
2006; Gerring 2001; Levy 2002; Przeworski and Teune 1982; Seawright and Gerring 
2008). 
2 Aytac and Onis (2014) categorize AKP as fitting a right-wing populism while juxtaposing this with FPV‟s 
left-wing populism. On the other hand, the authors analyze the expansion of social assistance programs 
in Turkey and Argentina, specifically highlighting the introduction of CCTs in both countries. 
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The Political Impact of CCTs in Turkey and Argentina 
In the clientelistic settings just described, can CCTs distribute their benefits in a 
non-clientelistic fashion? Can CCTs exert contagion effects and induce existing social 
programs to become less clientelistic? The current research suggests that a rational 
institutionalist explanation of the Conditional Cash Transfers in Turkey and Argentina is 
most persuasive. The evidence from the case studies shows that actors are savvy and 
adjust to the rules of the game. As a result, CCTs operate in non-clientelistic ways yet 
exist side-by-side with established clientelistic programs. Both politicians and citizens 
rationally adapt to these different institutional settings, playing simultaneously by the 
divergent rules of these two “games.” 
The present comparison of two poverty-relief programs, the Conditional Cash 
Transfer (Şartlı Nakit Transferi - ŞNT) in Turkey and the Universal Child Allowance for 
Social Protection (Asignación Universal por Hijo para Protección Social - AUH) in 
Argentina, demonstrates that political parties known for their clientelistic histories did 
implement non-mediated and non-clientelistic social assistance programs in order to 
attract poor voters. Yet, I also show that the introduction of CCTs has failed to exert a 
spillover effect and prompt a transformation of established clientelistic programs, as 
constructivism hopes. Instead, Turkey‟s AKP and Argentina‟s FPV have continued to use 
existing social programs for patronage-based practices in order to appeal to their poor 
electorates. Consequently, party leaders apply two different logics, clientelistic and non- 
clientelistic, side-by-side. Similarly, citizens pragmatically seek benefits in whatever way 
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they can be obtained: in a clientelistic fashion here yet a non-clientelistic fashion there. 
Thus, I develop a rational theory in order to account for the coexistence of clientelistic 
and non-clientelistic programs in Turkey and Argentina, calling into question the 
expectations of culturalist and constructivist paradigms. 
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Culturalism Challenged: Eliminating Brokers by Design 
Contrary to culturalist predictions, the ruling AKP and the FPV did not interfere 
with the non-partisan allocation of the CCTs and did not manipulate these programs in 
order to make clientelistic bargains with constituents in exchange for their political 
support. I use the results of the CCT Impact Assessments, findings from a 2012 Americas 
Barometer Survey, and my field observations in Istanbul and Buenos Aires to provide 
evidence of the non-clientelistic allocation of the CCTs. 
I rely on two questions asked in the CCT Impact Assessments to assess whether 
entrenched clientelism corrupted the design features of the CCT in Turkey. I first 
examine responses to a question asking who referred poor families to the CCT. If the 
majority of the respondents mentioned political parties, party brokers, or party 
representatives, this would indicate that ingrained clientelistic patterns prevailed over the 
institutional characteristics of the CCTs. According to the household survey (Ahmed et 
al. 2006) and the Second Qualitative and Anthropological Study (Adato et al. 2007), 
recipients cited schoolteachers, neighbors and relatives, neighborhood headmen 
(muhtars), and foundations as the primary information sources on the program rather than 
political parties and party brokers (Ahmed et al. 2007, vii). Therefore, these results 
conflict with the expectations of the culturalist paradigm. 
In line with the results of the CCT Impact Assessment, a mother receiving CCT 
benefits in Bagcilar, a low-income neighborhood in Istanbul, provided a similar story 
about the primary source of information and the CCT application process: 
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I receive child money. I heard about this assistance from my neighbors talking about it. I 
went to the Bagcilar Social Solidarity Foundation. Then, I went and received the money 
from the Post Office. I kept receiving my payments, and I did not face any problem 
receiving my payments. I receive child money every two months.3 
The effort to allocate the CCTs according to need is an indicator that this social 
assistance program is not distributed in a clientelistic or partisan fashion. The findings of 
the Impact Assessments demonstrate that the CCT is a well-targeted program. 
Bureaucratic criteria rather than partisan connections constitute the main factor that 
determines eligibility for the CCT. This finding is also at odds with the expectations of a 
culturalist paradigm. According to the findings of the Second Qualitative and 
Anthropological Study (Adato et al. 2007), poverty stands out as the major selection 
criterion cited by most beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (Ahmed et al. 2007, 41). Terry 
Roopnaraine, who worked on the qualitative component of the CCT evaluation in Turkey 
prepared by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), echoed these 
findings: 
A majority cited poverty as the main criterion of selection: Very few mentioned 
corruption or nepotism as the major selection criterion. About seventy percent thought 
that the selection process was fair. Errors of exclusion were reported as more of an issue 
than errors of inclusion.4 
3 Interview conducted by Elif Ozdemir and the author in Bagcilar on May 13, 2013. Among the recipients 
in Turkey, the CCT is known as child money (çocuk parası). Social Solidarity Foundations are 
responsible for distributing CCTs in Turkey. 
4 Interview conducted by Gokce Baykal and the author, May 10, 2013. 
16 
Jeanine Braithwaite, former senior economist at the World Bank, responsible for 
preparing the first draft of the Proxy Means Testing Scoring Formula, underscores how 
the targeting mechanism of the CCT was intended to eliminate politicization and 
discretion in choosing CCT recipients: 
I was somewhat concerned about discretion; however, I knew most of the deserving poor 
were going to be captured by the scoring formula. The scoring formula was unusually 
well targeted. My concern was that, before the CCT, there had had to be a high level of 
discretion, because they did not really have any written procedures: they did not have any 
monitorable way to discuss who would be in and out. With the Proxy Means Testing 
Scoring Formula, there was now a paper record that showed you how many children, 
household assets, and sheep, or goats, etc. the applicant had.5 
My interviewees echoed the view that the CCTs are distributed based on need and 
poverty rather than partisan connections. A woman in Bagcilar responded to the question 
of why she is receiving the CCT money as follows: “I receive this money because I am 
not in good condition and because my husband is not with me. I am needy.”6 
Furthermore, bureaucrats at the Ministry of Family and Social Policy in Turkey 
suggested that CCT recipients are aware of the toll-free number and use it to ask 
questions about why their applications are rejected. In other words, the applicants use this 
bureaucratic mechanism rather than asking favors from party brokers to solve their 
problems with the CCT. 
5 Interview conducted by Gokce Baykal and the author, June 6, 2013. 
6 Interview conducted by Elif Ozdemir and the author, May 13, 2013. 
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Employees try to respond to these calls, either by checking whether the applicants 
have social security and whether they have an asset such as a house and are thus deemed 
ineligible for the CCT. Citizens also use 144 to ask questions about their payments. 
Employees respond to citizens‟ calls by telling them that their payments are ready and 
they can withdraw the money from a Ziraat Bank branch or at post offices by showing 
their IDs.7 
My research in Argentina yielded similar findings. An Americas Barometer 
Survey (Lodola and Seligson 2012) shows that the AUH is distributed according to 
predetermined economic criteria. Contrary to culturalist expectations, receiving the AUH 
is not dependent on any political or electoral factors. Neither petitioning a mayor nor 
participating in a form of protest or mobilization influences access to the AUH. The 
program is well targeted in its allocation and not driven by a political or electoral logic 
(Lodola and Seligson 2012; Lodola and Mangonnet 2013). These are important results, 
given the long history of misusing social goods provisioning for electoral purposes in 
Argentina. 
The fieldwork conducted in low-income neighborhoods of Buenos Aires 
corroborates these findings. Respondents stated that the AUH signaled a rupture with the 
political allocation of previous social assistance programs. One of the interviewees, a 
resident in La Cava, stated the following: 
The Plan Trabajar and Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogares were used politically. Families 
benefiting from those plans had to respond to the demands of the Piquetero movements; 
7 Interview with Ahmet Fatih Ortakaya, family and social policy expert, conducted by the author, July 30, 
2012. Ziraat Bank is a state-owned bank. 
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they had to protest in the streets. They were obliged to do this in order to keep the plans. 
The AUH is a right. It is not like, “If you do not vote for me, you will no longer have this 
bag of food.”8 
Furthermore, most of my interviewees in Buenos Aires emphasized that the AUH 
is a right granted to children whose mothers are receiving support, rather than a favor 
allocated at the discretion of the Peronist Party machine in return for political support: 
AUH is implemented in order to fulfill the rights of children in the areas of health and 
education. If you do not comply with the conditions of the AUH, then you will lose your 
benefit.9 
Overall, the empirical evidence provided in the case studies calls into question the 
expectations of culturalism. The CCTs have remained immune from deeply ingrained 
clientelistic practices of the incumbent political parties in Turkey and Argentina. 
8 Interview with Norma Arispe conducted by Marina González and the author, August 14, 2013. Piqueteros 
refer to the unemployed workers that started demonstrating in Argentina since 1997. The Piquetero 
movement gained momentum and spread throughout the country as the movement united unemployed 
workers in the wake of the 2001 financial crisis, forming a consistent base of support for previous president 
Néstor Kirchner. 
9 Interview with Mariana Miño conducted by Marina González and the author, August 22, 2013. 
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Questioning Constructivism: The Persistence of Clientelism 
If clientelism cannot penetrate and corrode the CCTs, as the previous section 
showed, then can these novel social programs over time push aside the clientelism 
pervading traditional social assistance? In other words, do the CCTs with their modern 
and advanced principles have the potential to bring about, incrementally, a broader 
transformation in the social assistance framework of Turkey and Argentina, as 
constructivism predicts? 
The constructivist paradigm does not predict an immediate transformation of the 
social assistance framework such as the demise of clientelistic practices, which would 
take time: The introduction of modern social programs such as CCTs would inspire 
growing demands for change and sooner or later unleash pressure for a transformation. 
Accordingly, given the amount of time that has passed since the introduction of AUH in 
2009, constructivists would have expected that there would by now be significant 
demands in Argentina to transform the existing clientelistic social programs. 
Furthermore, because more than a decade has passed since the initiation of the Turkish 
CCT in 2004, constructivism predicts actual efforts and, perhaps changes in the Turkish 
social assistance scheme. However, neither demands from lower classes in Argentina nor 
genuine efforts towards the dissolution of existing clientelistic programs in Turkey have 
emerged. Instead, as the following section shows, clientelistic practices persist relatively 
unaffected in both countries. The absence of demands from the lower classes in 
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Argentina and the lack of genuine political change in Turkey call into question the 
progressive hopes of constructivism. 
Turkey‟s AKP, using its resource advantage over the opposition parties, appeals 
to voters largely by means of clientelistic social assistance and by offering patronage to 
party members. The AKP has been in power for twelve years and has had a strong 
presence in local politics. These advantages enable the AKP to target patronage and 
clientelistic benefits in order to attract voters and win their support. Party brokers have 
access to information about the needs of their districts, and they can easily curry favor 
with destitute sectors (the needy, the elderly, and the disabled) by offering material 
benefits. The Composite Clientelism Index prepared by Kitschelt and his team bears 
testimony to the governing party‟s dominant clientelistic practices. Accordingly, the 
incumbent party has the highest score in Turkey, with an index score of 3.93, where the 
index ranges from 1 to 4 (Kitschelt 2011).10 Interviews in low-income neighborhoods of 
Istanbul confirm this finding, portraying the everyday operations of the AKP‟s 
clientelistic machine. Interviews in Bagcilar, for example, revealed that citizens come to 
the AKP branch to ask for all kinds of favors, ranging from obtaining work permits to 
appealing a court decision.11 Contacts at the AKP branch can also help with finding a job. 
Numerous citizens leave their resumes for this purpose: 
10 Details of this expert survey project and datasets can be found at 
https://web.duke.edu/democracy/index.html 
11 The environment in the AKP Party office in Bagcilar was strikingly similar to that of an Argentine 
Peronist Party branch (Unidad Básica), as presented in Javier Auyero‟s influential Poor People’s 
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Half of those who come here ask for employment. For example, if we know that there are 
employment opportunities, we would like to direct these opportunities to our party members. 
We inform our neighborhood party organizations. People are leaving their resumes in the 
neighborhood organizations. How actively they are working in these neighborhood 
organizations and how they have been serving the party are important in terms of providing 
them employment.12 
Other interviewees mentioned AKP‟s distribution of patronage as a crucial tool for 
attracting support and highlighted that party connections increase one‟s likelihood of finding 
employment.13 In addition to allocating patronage, the AKP also distributes other material 
benefits including Turkish coffee, pens, badges, coal, furniture, washing machines, dishwashers, 
refrigerators, food cheques, and food boxes to win the support of voters, especially prior to 
elections. Neighborhood headmen underscored how the municipalities governed by the AKP 
and party organizations prepared lists to distribute food packages and social assistance to their 
party members.14 One neighborhood headman stated the following: 
Politics. There was a huge influx of people in the office, asking for a variety of favors from the political 
party representatives. 
12 Interview with party officer at AKP Umraniye District Organization conducted by Elif Ozdemir and the 
author, May 21, 2013. 
13 A neighborhood headman (muhtar) in Bagcilar on May 20, 2013, stated in an interview with the author 
“Generally, those affiliated with the AKP organizations are recruited and given employment especially 
for private-sector-related jobs.” In a similar vein, a neighborhood headman‟s son in Bagcilar on May 
13, 2013, stated “People who have connections with the AKP organization have no problem getting 
recruited or finding employment.” 
14 A neighborhood headman in Umraniye on May 27, 2013 stated “The AKP‟s women‟s branches prepare 
lists to allocate resources on the basis of party ID in a political way.” On October 19, 2012, another 
neighborhood headman in Kartal, a low-income neighborhood in Istanbul stated “The social assistance 
allocated through the AKP municipalities is political. The AKP organization prepares lists and 
distributes social assistance to people in their own circles.” 
22 
I have heard from residents of instances of the distribution of food and gold and other valuable 
presents by AKP officials in AKP-affiliated vehicles. These instances generally coincide with 
the election times.15 
In Argentina, clientelism is also a tool that the FPV continues to use to appeal to voters. 
For example, 13.4 percent of respondents to the Americas Barometer Survey in Argentina 
reported to have been offered a range of material goods in exchange for their vote; this figure 
rose to 15.3 percent among those who voted for President Fernández de Kirchner in the 2011 
elections. These figures are probably low estimates as many respondents may be unwilling to 
confess their participation in vote exchanges due to social desirability bias (Lodola and Seligson 
2012, 243–244). 
The empirical evidence gathered through this study in low-income neighborhoods in 
Buenos Aires supports these findings. The interviewees attested to the continuation of vote 
buying in these poor neighborhoods. One of the interviewees noted that La Cámpora, a political 
youth organization supporting the FPV, distributes material benefits and asks for reciprocity. 
“They oblige you to attend the organization‟s meetings in exchange,”16 she stated. Furthermore, 
most of these exchanges take place before an election. When she was asked whether vote 
buying takes place in her neighborhood, she responded “There is vote buying everywhere.”17 
Another interviewee elaborated further: “La Cámpora has more things to distribute, because it 
15 Interview with a neigborhood headman in Kartal conducted by Sebnem Gumuscu and the author, 
October 19, 2012. 
16 Interview with Clarissa conducted by Marina González and the author, August 19, 2013. 
17 Ibid. 
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uses the resources of the state. This is called clientelism. They make you think that the provision 
is a favor that they grant rather than a right that the state is responsible for.”18 
The persistence of clientelism in both countries casts doubt on constructivist hypotheses. 
Constructivism emphasizes the normative superiority of rights-based ideas and practices and 
their eventual spread over time; therefore, the theory would expect CCTs to exert a spillover 
effect on existing social programs. However, the creation of CCTs has not prompted a 
redefinition of interests among political parties providing clientelistic benefits to voters or 
voters receiving clientelistic benefits in exchange for political support. The introduction of the 
CCTs in these two countries has not engendered calls from the lower classes for the dissolution 
of clientelistic practices. The party machines of the AKP and the FPV continue to rely on the 
clientelistic distribution of material benefits as voters continue to receive these material benefits 
and offer for political support in exchange. 
18 Interview with Silvia conducted by Marina González and the author, July 19, 2013. 
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A Rationalist Approach: Navigating Bureaucratic and Clientelistic Forms of Social 
Assistance 
The empirical evidence provided above lends credence to a rationalist paradigm. 
The theory proposed here suggests that making use of both non-clientelistic and 
clientelistic programs for the poor electorate is rational from the perspective of political 
parties that desire to maximize their vote-winning potential. By relying on CCTs and 
broker-mediated clientelistic social programs side-by-side, these political parties 
strategically use every tool available to attract support among voters. With similar 
rational pragmatism, voters obtain benefits in a non-clientelistic fashion from CCTs and 
in clientelistic ways from traditional social programs.19 
Clientelism remains useful for political leaders in Turkey and Argentina as a 
strategy to attract and retain support from poor voters. Accordingly, both the AKP and 
FPV continue to offer benefits in exchange for constituents‟ votes prior to elections. It is 
strategically important for politicians in these two countries to maintain their clientelistic 
party machine through the distribution of material inducements by political party brokers. 
This strategy is crucial among the many tools that enable leaders to garner support from 
impoverished citizens. 
Distributing the CCTs in a non-clientelistic way is also strategically desirable for 
the leaders in Turkey and Argentina, since they are able to boost their popularity and 
19 I would like to thank Jennifer Pribble and Juan Pablo Luna for their suggestions on distinct linkage 
strategies. 
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support and reach out to new groups by efficiently using these non-clientelistic benefits 
while maintaining their established clientelistic networks. Non-politicized programs are 
popular in the eyes of the poor electorate and, therefore, help create direct linkages 
between political leaders and voters. Insights from the literature suggest that these direct 
social assistance programs yield political rewards: They enhance the reelection bids of 
the politicians who are credited with initiating them (Díaz-Cayeros, Estévez, and 
Magaloni 2006; Fried 2012; Hunter and Power 2007; Layton and Smith 2011; Menocal 
2001; Schady 2000; Zucco 2008). The following analysis will demonstrate how Turkey‟s 
AKP and Argentina‟s FPV systematically increased their vote shares after the 
introduction of these popular poverty-alleviation programs. CCTs were vital in the 
reelection bids of the leaders in Turkey and Argentina. Thus, traditional exchanges and 
non-clientelistic CCTs coexist, allowing politicians to cast as wide a net as possible. 
Distribution of non-clientelistic social assistance can be better for politicians in 
various ways. Broker-mediated clientelism can sometimes be problematic, because 
brokers have latitude to defect to other political candidates. Under these circumstances, 
the introduction of non-clientelistic poverty-relief programs directly associated with 
leaders provides a more secure allocation of resources to low-income voters, which 
compensates for party defection among clientelistic brokers. This accounts for why 
Argentina‟s President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner made the calculated choice to 
implement a non-clientelistic program. Furthermore, political parties can also compete 
with already established clientelistic parties in their effort to attract low-income voters. 
The need to outcompete an established patronage machine induces governing parties to 
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implement non-clientelistic programs when facing rival clientelistic parties. Direct and 
centralized social assistance can also be used to contain more politicized groups or ease 
unrest within societies. These two factors explain the rational calculations behind 
Turkey‟s non-clientelistic allocation of CCT. 
Even though the introduction of the Turkish CCT gained its impulse from an 
exogenous actor, the World Bank, the AKP used this poverty-relief program to 
strategically bolster its image as a promoter of social justice. The CCT was part of a 
World Bank-initiated Social Risk Mitigation Project (SRMP), which provided loans to 
Turkey right after the country‟s severe 2001 financial crisis. The Turkish CCT was the 
first regular cash transfer program to target the most vulnerable segments of society. Prior 
to the initiation of the World Bank-led SRMP, social assistance in Turkey was limited 
and was composed of ad hoc in-kind allocations (World Bank 2001, 4). The targeting 
mechanism was also an innovation of the Turkish CCT. The World Bank loan was given 
to Turkey with strict conditions, especially the establishment of the targeting mechanism 
to select the CCT beneficiaries.20 The SRMP was introduced by a coalition government 
consisting of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Motherland Party (ANAP), and the 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP). 
20 Jeanine Braithwaite, former senior economist at the World Bank, highlighted this dimension during an 
e-mail exchange with the author on February 26, 2014. Braithwaite stated “The CCT was designed so 
that the targeting mechanism could not be manipulated by individuals or agencies. Either Turkey took 
the targeting as part of the package, or the loan might not have been made.” 
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Although this project was initiated prior to the AKP‟s rise to power, after its 
victory, the AKP strategically publicized the SRMP, especially its CCT component, as an 
opportunity to garner support from economically disadvantaged groups. These efforts 
have been effective: The SRMP has proven to be a boon for the incumbent party, because 
various news stories referred to the project as a noteworthy accomplishment of the World 
Bank and the AKP. In addition, as part of the promotion scheme for the AKP, in 2006, 
the Project Coordination Unit for the SRMP organized the third international CCT 
conference in Istanbul. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, then Prime Minister and the leader of the 
AKP, along with more than 350 participants from various countries, attended the 
conference (Yilmaz Sener 2010, 102–103). As the governing AKP established ownership 
over the CCT, the incumbent party cemented its reputation with the poor electorate. 
When the World Bank loan ended in 2006, the ruling AKP kept the program in 
line with the party‟s strategic calculations, financing it through the Social Solidarity 
Fund. This poverty-alleviation program was popular in the eyes of its beneficiaries, and 
impact assessments showed that the program had positive effects. Dismantling the 
program would have created a backlash among its recipients. As highlighted by one of 
the interviewees, “The party had seen the value of the CCT program and was aware of 
the extremely favorable impact evaluation findings.”21 Furthermore, the AKP, as a savvy 
actor, not only continued with the program but expanded it. The World Bank‟s initial 
coverage target was to reach one million recipients. However, when the AKP government 
21 Jeanine Braithwaite, in an email exchange with the author, February 26, 2014. 
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started to finance the CCT with state funds, the program grew to benefit around three 
million people (Esenyel 2010). Simultaneously, the amount of money allocated for the 
CCT payments nearly tripled.22 
In line with this electoral logic, the Turkish conditional cash transfer became one 
of the main themes raised by the AKP leader, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan, during his campaign speeches prior to the 2011 elections. Erdogan underscored 
the amount of money allocated to poor children by means of the CCT, as well as the total 
number of youngsters benefiting from this social assistance program, stressing his party‟s 
major policies benefiting the poor (Erdogan 2011).23 Such speeches demonstrate the key 
role of the Turkish CCT in the incumbent party‟s campaign strategies. These efforts paid 
off. The AKP systematically increased its vote share in three consecutive general 
elections in 2002, 2007, and 2011 from 34 percent to 48 percent and 50 percent, 
respectively.24 
Traditionally clientelistic inducements will be less effective when a political party 
seeks to attract votes from the low-income supporters of another established clientelistic 
22 See www.sosyalyardimlar.gov.tr 
23 One such example is Erdogan‟s election speech in Muş, a city located in Eastern Turkey: “We used to 
allocate Turkish Lira (TL) 20 (US$ 9) to boys in primary school. This amount has risen to TL 30 
(US$13 US). We used to distribute TL 25 (US$ 11) to girls in primary school. Now, it has increased to 
TL 35 (US$ 15 US). The amount of money we allocate to boys and girls in secondary school has also 
risen from TL 35 (US$ 15) to TL 45 (US$ 20) and TL 45 (US$ 20 US) to TL 55 (US$ 25) respectively. 
Do you know the amount of assistance we distributed as part of the CCT in total reached 32 trillion 
(US$ 14 trillion US) in Muş?” (Erdogan 2011). See http://www.akparti.org.tr/site/haberler/basbakan- 
erdoganin-mus-mitinginde-yaptigi-konusmanin-tam-metni/7195#1 
24 See www.ysk.gov.tr 
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party. This was indeed the case as the governing AKP aimed to increase its popularity in 
the Kurdish-populated areas of eastern and southeastern Turkey. Eastern and southeastern 
Turkey are the poorest regions in the country. The incumbent party‟s main contender in 
these areas is the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).25 According to the 
Composite Clientelism Index devised at Duke University, the BDP is the second most 
clientelistic party in Turkey with an index score of 3.14 (Kitschelt 2011).26 Furthermore, 
the results of a survey conducted by KONDA Research and Consultancy, a public 
opinion polling company, demonstrate that the AKP and the BDP are the major parties 
vying for the support of the poor electorate. Under these circumstances, the likelihood 
that the AKP could attract the BDP supporters through traditional, broker-mediated 
clientelistic means is low. The results of the above-mentioned survey, however, show that 
about 14 percent of those who supported the BDP at the national level in the 2002 
elections shifted their support to the incumbent AKP in 2007 (Yoruk 2012, 523). The 
allocation of the CCTs can account for this shift in support. The data on the regional 
distribution of the Turkish CCT as of 2009 show that around 63 percent of the CCT 
beneficiaries live in eastern and southeastern Turkey (Esenyel 2010). The non- 
clientelistic distribution of the CCTs gave the AKP a novel opportunity to bypass the 
BDP‟s party machine and form a non-mediated link with voters in the region. 
25 At the time, the name of the party was the Democratic Society Party (DTP); it was closed in 2009. 
26 The author observed the problem-solving nature of the BDP party branch during fieldwork in Istanbul. 
The visit to the political party branch of the BDP in Bagcilar‟s Demirkapi neighborhood, which has a 
large Kurdish population, indicated that, despite the resource limitations, the party seeks to find jobs for 
their unemployed partisans by using their connections in the textile business, distributes food supplies, 
and helps solve the daily problems of their supporters. 
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Consequently, a close comparison of the governing AKP‟s vote share in cities of eastern 
and southeastern Turkey in 2002 and 2007 showcases the remarkable increase in the 
party‟s support in the region. This trend coincided with a decline in the regional support 
for the BDP. Although the AKP vote share declined in 2011 compared to its level in 
2007, even this level was much higher than its initial support in the 2002 general 
elections.27 
Moreover, as the extant literature shows, social policy can be used to ease tension 
amongst politicized groups (Bohn 2011; Carrión 2006; Yoruk 2012). The introduction of 
the Turkish CCT occurred at a very opportune time, as the newly elected AKP 
administration sought to ease the ethnic problem in the country by reaching out to the 
Kurds.28 In the words of Mesut Yegen, “The way the AKP promised to show Kurds the 
compassionate and service-rendering face of the state enhanced the party‟s appeal to 
Kurds” (Yegen 2011, 160). The allocation of the CCTs, as regular, non-mediated income 
subsidy programs can be depicted as a calculating strategy by the AKP to ease the unrest 
in the region and please Kurdish citizens. 
Similar to the Turkish case, Argentine President Fernández de Kirchner‟s 
strategic calculations explain the introduction of a non-clientelistic program in Argentina. 
The results of the 2009 midterm legislative elections in Argentina paved the way for the 
creation of the AUH. Prior to this contest, an increasing number of Peronists defected 
27 For a detailed analysis of the vote shares of the AKP and the BDP for the cities located in eastern and 
southeastern Turkey for the 2002, 2007, and 2011 general elections, see Mesut Yegen (2011). 
28 The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) fought an armed struggle in order to attain self-determination for 
Kurds in Turkey. A ceasefire was announced between the PKK and the Turkish state in 2013. 
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from the governing FPV faction. While some of these politicians established their own 
parties, others were nominated under other PJ lists. One faction opposing the Kirchners 
within the Peronist Party forged a center-right alliance, which was led by Mauricio Macri 
of the Republican Proposal (Propuesta Republicana, or PRO). This center-right coalition 
included prominent figures like Francisco de Narváez, a dissident Peronist, and Felipe 
Solá, the former governor of the Province of Buenos Aires. Meanwhile, some other 
politicians opted to remain within the Peronist Party, even though they decided not to be 
part of the Kirchners‟ FPV faction. De Narváez and Solá were at the top of the PRO list 
for the province of Buenos Aires, where they competed against Néstor Kirchner and 
Daniel Scioli, on the FPV list (Lupu 2010, 174–175). 
The election results signaled a remarkable defeat for the Kirchners as the FPV lost 
its majority in both houses of Congress. The FPV was defeated in strategic provinces 
such as Buenos Aires, Mendoza, and Santa Cruz, Kirchner‟s birthplace. For instance, the 
FPV list lost to de Narváez‟s list with 32.2 percent to 34.7 percent (Lupu 2010, 176). The 
FPV suffered a 15-point drop in its vote share during the 2009 elections compared to the 
2007 elections. This sharp decrease in her faction‟s vote share signaled to the president 
that her reelection bid in 2011 would be in danger (Calvo and Murillo 2012, 155). In 
2009, the defeat of the FPV faction demonstrated that Peronist Party brokers could easily 
defect from the president. Evidently, the clientelistic distribution of social assistance 
through political party brokers no longer guaranteed the support of low-income 
neighborhoods for the president and her allies. To the president, this setback clearly 
indicated the need to launch a new social assistance program that would allow the FPV 
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faction to recapture the support of poor voters and help the incumbent in her reelection 
bid (Pribble 2013). Therefore, on October 13, 2009, President Fernández de Kirchner 
introduced the AUH with the rationale that by taking the initiative, she and her party 
could claim the credit for implementing such a program and improve their popularity in 
low-income neighborhoods.29 
The presidential elections of 2011 indeed resulted in a victory for President 
Fernández de Kirchner by a considerable margin. She amassed 54.1 percent of the votes, 
exceeding her 2007 vote share by 9 percentage points. There was such a colossal gap 
between Kirchner and all other presidential candidates that the support for her closest 
contender, Hermes Binner from the Socialist Party, stood merely at 16.8 percent of the 
national vote. In addition, Kirchner‟s FPV coalition secured a majority by winning 135 
out of 257 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 38 of 72 seats in the Senate, reversing 
the setback suffered in the 2009 elections (Calvo and Murillo 2012, 148). President 
Kirchner garnered astounding support from the voters living in squatter settlements such 
as Florencio Varela, Guernico, Ezeiza, Lomas de Zamora, and Retiro with more than 60 
percent of the ballots (Calvo and Murillo 2012, 157). The increase in President 
Kirchner‟s support in low-income neighborhoods and squatter settlements can be partly 
attributed to the introduction of the AUH, which is very popular among the recipients of 
the program. 
29 The AUH was created by decree 1602-09. 
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With its innovative design features, the AUH program has achieved acclaim in 
Argentina. One of the interviewees stated the following: “It is on the agenda of these 
election campaigns. One of the first things that residents ask an opponent is whether she 
is going to keep the AUH.”30 Meanwhile, by keeping the AUH as a decree and not 
turning it into a law, President Kirchner can easily claim credit for the program and 
depict herself as the guarantor of its maintenance. For example, all of the 30 program 
recipients interviewed for a study that examined social policy performance in multi-level 
contexts in December 2009 named the national government as responsible for the 
initiation of this poverty-relief program (Niedzwiecki 2013, 24). Therefore, the AUH 
gave President Kirchner and her faction of the PJ a new vehicle by which to appeal to 
poor voters – one for which she can easily claim credit.31 Thus, similarly to Turkey‟s 
CCT, Argentina‟s AUH was crucial for the reelection bid of President Kirchner. 
From the perspective of strategic political parties, some contexts are more 
favorable for non-clientelistic social programs than clientelistic ones. Under those 
circumstances, savvy political leaders will choose non-mediated social policies. This 
section shed light on the rational calculations of the leaders in Turkey and Argentina by 
highlighting how the distribution of non-clientelistic CCTs boosted popular support for 
their leadership. In addition, these popular poverty-alleviation programs helped leaders 
30 Interview with Leandro Martín conducted by Marina González, August 23, 2013. In a similar vein, a 
news story that appeared in America‟s Quarterly noted “All presidential candidates have promised to 
maintain the program [AUH] if they win the presidency” 
(http://www.americasquarterly.org/content/argentinas-economy-and-2015-presidential-elections) 
31 All the news stories that appeared on the AUH portrayed the program in a very positive light, presenting 
it as one of the most transcendent social policies in Argentina and one of President Kirchner‟s most 
crucial achievements. 
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with their bids for reelection by enabling them to either circumvent political party brokers 
or to appeal to populations that they would not be able to attract through broker- 
mediated, clientelistic inducements. 
CCT design differs from traditional clientelistic programs and thus establishes a 
different incentive structure for savvy voters in terms of their receipt of resources. As the 
preceding sections demonstrated, voters use bureaucratic problem-solving mechanisms 
instead of political party connections to gain access to CCTs in Turkey and Argentina. 
Yet, the same voters continue to make use of political party networks and clientelistic 
linkages to access benefits that continue to be distributed as favors in these two countries. 
Thus constituents use clientelistic and non-clientelistic linkages simultaneously to 
maximize their access to social benefits in order to gain access to CCTs and other 
benefits. Similar to strategic politicians who use every tool available to attract poor 
constituents, voters easily adjust their behavior to different rules of the game; they 
approach party brokers in a clientelistic way while relating as citizens to CCTs. 
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Conclusion 
The comparison of CCT programs in Turkey and Argentina implemented by the 
thoroughly clientelistic AKP and FPV, respectively, yields a number of important 
findings and implications. First, it systematically tests the predictions of three major 
paradigms and lends support to the RCI approach, which contends that actors will adapt 
to the existing institutional constraints in order to pursue their interests. Rules constrain 
and incentivize behavior, and pragmatic actors adjust to the different rules of the game 
and behave accordingly. The design of the CCTs differs from traditional broker-mediated 
clientelistic programs, which creates a different incentive structure for rational actors 
with respect to their allocation and receipt of resources. In this case, contrary to the 
expectations of culturalism, entrenched practices do not determine behavior. Instead, 
rules shape behavior, even if they conflict with deeply rooted patterns prevailing in 
societies. More specifically, modern programs are not doomed in clientelistic settings: 
Established brokers have not managed to capture CCTs and turn their benefit distribution 
into another source for clientelism. 
Second, at the same time, this study challenges the progressive hopes of 
constructivism. By design, CCTs are normatively superior to traditional clientelistic 
exchanges: however, their superiority has not induced a broader programmatic shift in 
social assistance allocation of these two countries. In contrast to the constructivists‟ 
optimistic expectations, clientelism has not withered away: CCTs operate parallel to other 
clientelistic forms of social assistance that target impoverished voters. Political party 
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brokers continue to distribute clientelistic inducements to low-income citizens in 
exchange for their political support. Political parties and voters pragmatically adjust their 
behavior according to the rules of different games, both clientelistic and non-clientelistic. 
This research draws attention to how political leaders use rational calculations to 
shape distributive social policies. As the paired case studies suggest, clientelism can 
sometimes be risky, difficult, and compromising for savvy political leaders. Under those 
circumstances, calculating leaders will opt for non-clientelistic poverty-relief programs. 
Research shows that the non-clientelistic allocation of CCTs in Turkey and Argentina has 
been politically rewarding for chief executives. The AUH allowed President Fernández 
de Kirchner to bypass political party brokers and claim credit for her own popular 
poverty-alleviation program. Likewise, the Turkish CCT provided AKP leader Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan with a unique opportunity to appeal to the Kurdish population, increase 
his party‟s vote share in the eastern and southeastern regions, and ease ethnic unrest. 
Finally, this study offers insights into the effectiveness of policy reforms. Partial 
reform is possible via the introduction of new rules in particular policy areas, as 
demonstrated by the distribution of CCT benefits to poverty-stricken recipients in Turkey 
and Argentina. Nevertheless, radical transformation of entrenched practices is hard to 
achieve. Formal changes do not automatically transform the norms and expectations of 
actors; that is, such changes only bring about partial reform in specific policy areas rather 
than drastic transformation of existing practices in societies. 
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